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INTRODUCTION 
 
 A fundamental means by which firms explore and develop new resources and capabilities 
is through external initiatives such as corporate venture capital (CVC) investing, strategic 
alliances, and acquisitions (Keil, 2002). While acquisitions and strategic alliances have received 
substantial scholarly attention, research on CVC investing has only recently experienced 
renewed interest (Dushnitsky, 2006). CVC investments are direct minority equity investments 
made by established companies in privately-held entrepreneurial ventures (Dushnitsky, 2006). 
CVC relationships are exploratory initiatives because they establish boundary-spanning 
relationships with new ventures, which often pursue novel technologies and are an important 
source of knowledge for corporate investors (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005). Although firms may 
seek direct financial returns from their CVC investments, strategic motives typically dominate 
financial incentives (Dushnitsky, 2006). 
 Due to their uncertain and exploratory nature and the limited access they provide, CVC 
relationships may be insufficient to realize strategic benefits. While some research shows CVC 
investing can increase investor performance (e.g., Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005, 2006), other 
research shows CVC investments can have diminishing and negative returns to investor 
innovation performance (Wadhwa & Kotha, 2006). Moreover, CVC investing units often 
experience difficulty in facilitating the transfer of knowledge from their entrepreneurial ventures 
to their parent firms’ business units that can benefit from this knowledge (Henderson & Leleux, 
2002). To realize the learning potential from CVC relationships and generate greater value from 
them, corporate investors may have to increase their involvement in their portfolio firms. One 
way to achieve this is through strategic alliances. Alliances differ from CVC relationships in that 
alliance partners mutually commit resources, beyond financial capital, to achieve a particular 
objective, while CVC investments entail a clear distinction between investors and users of funds 
and do not necessarily involve the mutual commitment of other firm resources (Dushnitsky & 
Lavie, 2007). While alliances offer the potential of enhanced interfirm learning (Hamel, 1991), 
they involve a greater degree of commitment than CVC relationships. The risk of commitment is 
exacerbated by the substantial uncertainty that surrounds entrepreneurial ventures. Given this 
tension, this paper examines the conditions under which a CVC investment between a corporate 
investor and a venture leads to the formation of a strategic alliance between the two firms. 
Research characterizes CVC investing as a flexible means of obtaining privileged access 
to information about future opportunities (Li & Mahoney, 2006). Research shows firms use CVC 
investing to identify potential alliance partners and acquisition targets (Dushnitsky, 2006), and 
has examined the complementarities and trade-offs between CVC and alliances (Dushnitsky & 
Lavie, 2007), the choice between CVC and acquisition (Tong & Li, 2007) and the effect of prior 
CVC relationships on acquisition performance (Benson & Ziedonis, 2009). Despite these studies, 
research has not investigated whether or when a CVC investment results in alliance formation.  
The purpose of this study is to identify and empirically test factors that influence whether 
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a venture and its corporate investor subsequently form a strategic alliance. Drawing on research 
that characterizes CVC investments as real options (e.g., Hurry, Miller & Bowman, 1992), we 
argue an initial CVC investment creates a compound growth option. The formation of an alliance 
with a portfolio firm is akin to exercising the second stage of this option. We explore how 
different types of uncertainty and a corporate investor’s resources influence the likelihood of 
alliance formation. We test our predictions on a sample of 256 investor-venture dyads. 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Real options confer the right, but not the obligation, to participate in a future strategic 
opportunity requiring more investment (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994). Real options allow irreversible 
investments in uncertain opportunities to be deferred, thus reducing commitment and preserving 
flexibility (Folta, 1998). CVC investments serve as real options for investing firms (Allen & 
Hevert, 2007), constituting relatively small, irreversible resource commitments to novel and 
uncertain initiatives. They allow firms to minimize commitment and downside risk, while 
retaining their ability to gain via subsequent investment from the upside potential of good ideas. 
Ventures have high dissolution rates and often work with new technologies in unproven markets, 
creating uncertainty about viability of the technology and venture. If the venture fails, its assets 
cannot be easily redeployed, making the investment largely irreversible (Li & Mahoney, 2006). 
A firm that makes a CVC investment in a new venture purchases a real call option (Hurry 
et al., 1992) and acquires the right, but not the obligation, to participate in three kinds of future 
decisions about the venture. First, in the presence of potentially unfavorable outcomes, the 
investor can minimize its losses by abandoning the option by selling or writing off its equity 
stake (Li & Mahoney, 2006). Second, the investor can defer action to allow uncertainty to 
resolve over time. Third, CVC investments provide investors privileged access to valuable 
subsequent investment opportunities, or growth options (Li & Mahoney, 2006). Growth options 
are flexible platforms that investors can leverage to develop new resources and respond to future 
opportunities (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2001). A subsequent investment in the venture represents the 
exercise of the option and may create an additional option. In addition to providing explicit and 
exercisable option rights, CVC investments are accompanied by implicit preferential claims in 
that investors have privileged access to information about the ventures (Dushnitsky, 2006). This 
information reduces investor uncertainty about venture quality and provides it an advantaged 
position relative to non-investors (Folta & Miller, 2002).  
We characterize CVC investments as two-stage compound options (Kogut, 1991). The 
first stage occurs when a firm purchases equity in a startup. The second stage corresponds to the 
exercise of the option by forming an alliance with the venture. Greater commitment of resources 
by a corporate investor via an alliance with a venture provides several benefits to the investor. 
Alliances provide corporate investors with access to venture knowledge and opportunities for 
interfirm learning (Hamel, 1991), beyond what passive equity investments alone provide. CVC 
investments that precede alliances limit downside risk for corporate investors by providing them 
with valuable information about their ventures’ markets and technologies, allowing investors and 
ventures to make more informed and better decisions about alliance formation. 
We argue the exercise of the second stage growth option is influenced by two types of 
external uncertainty – venture uncertainty and competitive uncertainty. We also argue corporate 
investors can use their technological resources to strengthen their portfolio firms’ performance. 
This suggests that technologically rich investors may be able to endogenously reduce uncertainty 
in their portfolio firms and moderate the influence of external uncertainty on alliance formation.  
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Uncertainty 
 
Real options research emphasizes three types of uncertainty. Exogenous uncertainty is 
largely unaffected by firm actions and typically resolves over time (Folta, 1998), encouraging 
firms to delay investment (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994). Endogenous uncertainty can be resolved by 
an investor’s actions and motivates investors to invest sequentially (Folta, 1998). External 
uncertainty arises from sources external to the investor, but unlike exogenous uncertainty, it can 
be influenced by an investor’s actions, allowing it to “act as an agent of endogenous change” by 
attempting to “shape the contingencies in its favor” (McGrath, 1997). We argue two types of 
external uncertainty, venture and competitive uncertainty, influence whether the CVC investor 
will exercise its second stage option in the form of an alliance. 
Venture Uncertainty. In investment involving new ventures, uncertainty is often related 
to the market or technological arena the venture is pursuing. Accordingly, we focus on two types 
of uncertainty associated with new ventures - uncertainty related to their development (Venture 
Lifecycle Uncertainty) and uncertainty related to their technologies (Venture Technical 
Uncertainty). Corporate investors are likely to consider these types of venture uncertainty when 
deciding on whether and how to exercise growth options embedded in their CVC investments.  
New ventures suffer from a “liability of newness” (Stinchcombe, 1965). In early stages of 
development, a venture’s processes and systems are poorly developed and inefficient and it is 
less likely to attract stakeholders critical to its success. New ventures exhibit significant volatility 
in terms of their survival and future economic returns (Li & Mahoney, 2006). This uncertainty 
declines as the venture matures, becomes more stable and legitimate (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). On 
the technological front, new ventures are typically engaged in developing novel technologies that 
are often associated with new technological trajectories in which technical standards have not 
congealed, performance metrics are contested, underlying cause-effect relationships are poorly 
understood, and technical advances are rapid, increasing the risk of obsolescence (Garud & 
Rappa, 1994). This increases technical uncertainty, which reduces an investor’s ability to value 
the technology and increases its risk of adversely selecting a mediocre technology. This 
uncertainty diminishes over time as the technology is improved and more information becomes 
available about its commercial viability. Thus, as a venture’s lifecycle and technical uncertainty 
decline, a corporate investor is more likely to exercise its growth option by forming an alliance. 
H1: Given a CVC investment by corporate investor i in venture j, Venture Lifecycle 
Uncertainty decreases the likelihood they will form a strategic alliance. 
H2: Given a CVC investment by corporate investor i in venture j, Venture Technical 
Uncertainty decreases the likelihood they will form a strategic alliance. 
 
Competitive Uncertainty. Unlike financial options, which tend to be exclusive, real 
options can be shared among several option holders (Kester, 1984), who may act preemptively to 
exercise their option and appropriate some or all of its value (Trigeorgis, 1996). When compound 
options are shared among firms, each firm may have different reasons for exercising the option, 
and may assign different values to the underlying assets. The actions of individual option holders 
can increase the price of exercising the second stage option or greatly reduce its value (Folta & 
Miller, 2002). As more firms share an option, the uncertainty associated with capturing value 
from it increases. In such a competitive environment, if an investor fails to exercise the option it 
may be locked out in the future (McGrath & Nerkar, 2004).  
In the case of a compound option initiated by a CVC investment, a venture can receive 
funding from multiple investors, including traditional VCs and other corporation investors. 
Corporate investors typically co-invest with other VCs (Dushnitsky, 2006). After making a CVC 
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investment, corporate investors who wish to exercise the growth options in their portfolio firms 
through alliances can face two forms of competitive uncertainty. First, other investors may prefer 
the venture to exit via an IPO or an acquisition, and may not want the venture to form an alliance 
or may have other partners in mind for the venture. Second, a corporate investor may face 
competition from other CVC investors who want to exercise their growth options through an 
alliance with the venture. Moreover, since ventures are constrained in their ability to form and 
maintain multiple alliances, they may choose to form deeper relationships with fewer corporate 
investors. In both situations, waiting to exercise growth options through strategic alliances 
carries a threat of preemptive action by other investors and the corresponding loss of option 
value for the focal investor. As the number of other VCs that have invested in a venture increase, 
the threat of pre-emption increases, which increases competitive uncertainty. Thus, competitive 
uncertainty will positively affect alliance formation. 
H3: Given a CVC investment by corporate investor i in venture j, Competitive 
Uncertainty increases the likelihood they will form a strategic alliance. 
 
Investor Technological Resources 
 
In addition to the influence of external uncertainty, corporate investors’ choices are also 
influenced by their own resources (Li & Mahoney, 2006). An investor’s technological resources 
influence its perception of the uncertainty associated with a venture as well as its ability to 
diminish this uncertainty. Since investing firms possess heterogeneous resources and capabilities, 
they are likely to differ in how they perceive the uncertainty underlying a new venture. Firms 
with greater technical resources are better able to evaluate the technology of a venture and 
recognize how they can help the venture successfully commercialize its technology (Keil, 2002).  
Ventures also benefit from forming relationships with more technologically capable 
partners, which lower the uncertainty associated with the ventures. First, new ventures often do 
not possess the necessary complementary technical expertise to make their technologies a 
success. Corporate investors that possess these resources are in a better position to assist new 
ventures in successfully commercializing their technologies and entering new markets (Maula, 
2001), thereby reducing the uncertainty associated with these technologies. Second, a corporate 
investor’s technological resources will also reduce uncertainty associated with the developmental 
stage of a venture. Relationships with resource rich partners send positive signals of venture 
quality to other stakeholders (Stuart, Hoang & Hybels, 1999). When a corporate investor with 
deep technological resources signals support for a new venture, the venture gains legitimacy in 
the market, which can stimulate demand for its offerings. The more technologically competent 
the partners, the greater are the expected benefits to ventures. Because a corporate investor’s 
resources can reduce the lifecycle and technical uncertainty of a new venture, it can increase the 
venture’s economic value and decrease the investor’s incentive to wait for uncertainty resolution.  
H4: Investor Technological Resources will weaken the negative relationship between 
Venture Lifecycle Uncertainty and the likelihood of alliance formation. 
H5: Investor Technological Resources will weaken the negative relationship between 
Venture Technical Uncertainty and the likelihood of alliance formation. 
 The technological resources of a corporate investor will moderate the effect of 
competitive uncertainty. Since technologically rich corporate investors are better able to 
help ventures succeed and are more attractive partners for them, the risk of pre-emption 
by other investors is mitigated, decreasing the influence of competitive uncertainty.  
H6: Investor Technological Resources will weaken the positive relationship between 
Competitive Uncertainty and the likelihood of alliance formation. 
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METHODS AND RESULTS 
 
The setting for this study is the global telecommunications equipment industry. The 
sample consists of 256 investor-venture dyads involving 28 publicly-traded telecom equipment 
manufacturers that invested in 227 new ventures for the first time between 1995 and 1999. Table 
1 lists variables. Given the binary nature of the dependant variable, we use binary logit 
regression to estimate the data. Table 2 reports selected models from the regression analysis.  
--------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here 
--------------------------------------------- 
Hypothesis 1 predicted a negative effect of Venture Lifecycle Uncertainty on the 
probability of alliance formation. In Models 1-5, Venture Lifecycle Uncertainty is negative and 
significant, providing support for H1. Hypothesis 2 proposed Venture Technical Uncertainty is 
negatively associated with alliance formation. Results from Model 1-2 provide support for this 
hypothesis. The statistical insignificance of the simple effect of this variable in Models 3 and 4 is 
likely due to multicollinearity with the interaction terms which include this same variable. When 
we remove the non-significant interaction term including Venture Technical Uncertainty, the 
effect of Venture Technical Uncertainty becomes significant (Model 5). Thus, we find support 
for Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 3 posited a positive effect of Competitive Uncertainty on the 
likelihood of alliance formation. In Models 1-5, Competitive Uncertainty is positive and 
significant, providing support for H3. Of the three hypothesized interaction effects (H4-H6), we 
find support for H4 and H6. The interaction of Venture Lifecycle Uncertainty and Investor 
Technological Resources is significant and positive, supporting H4. The interaction of Investor 
Technological Resources and Competitive Uncertainty is significantly negative, supporting H6.  
 
DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the conditions under which a CVC 
investment between a corporate investor and venture leads to the formation of a strategic alliance 
between the two firms. We make contributions to several research literatures. First, we contribute 
to the corporate entrepreneurship literature. While research has examined a variety of external 
corporate venturing initiatives, most of this research examines these initiatives in isolation. Little 
research has examined when and if these activities complement or substitute for one another. The 
results of this study suggest that, under certain conditions, CVC investing and alliances are 
complementary venturing activities. Our results also shed light on how corporate investors 
attempt to create value from and through their investments. We find an investor’s technological 
resources play an important role in reducing venture uncertainty and in facilitating its 
involvement in its portfolio firms to increase the benefits from such collaboration. Second, our 
results have implications for the real options literature. While research has examined how 
uncertainty influences the creation and exercise of options, it has typically treated uncertainty as 
either exogenous or endogenous. We examine how different aspects of “external” uncertainty, 
which combines aspects of both exogenous and endogenous uncertainty, influence the creation 
and exercise of growth options. We also integrate firm heterogeneity into real options reasoning 
and highlight the role of investor resources in overcoming some of the uncertainty associated 
with these investments. Finally, we contribute to research on alliance formation. Although this 
research shows firms tend to form new alliances with firms they have allied with in the past as a 
way to manage partner uncertainty (e.g., Gulati, 1995), it has largely ignored the origins of the 
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initial alliances from which future alliances grow (Hallen, 2008). Recent studies suggest initial 
alliances often evolve from prior interpersonal relationships between members of the firms 
(Rosenkopf et al., 2001; Hallen, 2008). We add to this research by showing that CVC 
investments can also provide the initial tie between firms from which future alliances can grow.  
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Table 1: Measures 
 
Table 2: Logistic Regression Analysis 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Investor Tech. Resources 0.646* -0.336 -0.097 -0.141 -0.383
Venture Life Cycle Uncertainty -0.409* -3.106* -3.290* -3.941** -3.743**
Venture Technical Uncertainty -0.029+ -0.025+ 0.009 0.008 -0.027*
Competitive Uncertainty 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.013* 0.013*
Venture Life Cycle Uncertainty X 
Investor Tech. Resources 0.368* 0.393* 0.479* 0.452*
Venture Technical Uncertainty X 
Investor Tech. Resources -0.005 -0.005  
Competitive Uncertainty X  
Investor Tech. Resources -0.001+ -0.001+
Log Likelihood -125.83 -123.689 -123.609 -122.66 -122.744
Wald Chi 2 27.128*** 31.41*** 31.57*** 33.468*** 33.301***
N=256 for all models; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Two-tailed tests for controls and one-tailed test for hypothesized variables. 
Standard errors and results for control variables are not reported to save space.  
VARIABLE DEFINITION / OPERATIONALIZATION
Dependent  Variable 
Alliance 
Formed 
Dichotomous variable assigned a value of “1” if the existing CVC dyad 
involving corporate investor i and venture j subsequently formed an alliance.
Explanatory Variables 
Venture 
Lifecycle 
Uncertainty 
This variable was ordinally coded based on its stage of development: 4 (seed/ 
startup stage), 3 (expansion stage), 2 (mature), and 1 (buyout). Higher values 
reflect greater venture uncertainty since they reflect earlier development stages.
Venture 
Technical 
Uncertainty 
The number of patents granted to the new venture. This variable was reverse 
coded so that more venture patents were associated with lower values of 
Venture Technical Uncertainty.
Competitive 
Uncertainty 
The number of other investors that also invested in the venture, including 
traditional and corporate venture capitalists. The greater the number of other 
investors, the greater is Competitive Uncertainty.
Investor Tech. 
Resources 
The log of annual R&D expenditures (in $US million) of the corporate investor.
Control Variables 
Investor Size Natural log of annual sales (in $US million) for corporate investor 
Investor Age Number of years from the date of founding of  corporate investor 
Prior Investor 
Alliances 
Number of alliances, not including those involving portfolio firms, formed by 
corporate investor i during the four years prior to the CVC investment 
